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Defining the Crime of Excessive
Self-Defense: Voluntary Manslaughter
in Illinois
With the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961,1 the Illinois
legislature added an entirely new facet to the crime of voluntary
manslaughter. Where the prior statutory description of the offense,2 which had remained in effect largely unchanged since 1874,3
provided a single definition, this most recent codification provides
two.4 The second definition, while not unique among American jurisdictions, is certainly rare, being accepted in only four other
1. Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-1 to 43-2 (1981) (effective January 1, 1962).
2. The prior statute defined voluntary manslaughter as follows:
In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and
highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the
person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing.
The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion
supposed to be irresistible; for if there should appear to have been an
interval between the assault or provocation given, and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall
be attributed to deliberate revenge, and punished as murder.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 362 (1961).
3. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 144 (1874) with id., § 362 (1961) (same
wording, only numbers have changed).
4. The current Illinois law on voluntary manslaughter reads as follows:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation

by:

(1) The individual killed, or
(2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently
or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in
a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate
the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code' but his
belief is unreasonable.
(c) Sentence. Voluntary Manslaughter is a Class 1 felony.
'Paragraph 7-1 et seq. of this chapter.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1981).
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states.5 Little guidance as to the scope and intent of this new offense was provided by the drafters of the Code.'
This comment, by examining the twenty years of judicial history under subsection 9-2(b), will attempt to provide what the official comments to the Code left out: the apparent reasons and justifications for inclusion of this new subsection, an explanation of
how the courts have interpreted the language of the statute and an
analysis of what types of behavior might lead to conviction under
its provisions.
BACKGROUND

Before undertaking an analysis of the additional definition, a
brief explanation of the established concept of voluntary manslaughter is necessary. The prior statute defined the offense in
terms of a killing resulting from a serious and highly provoking or
personal injury, with the act occurring without the passage of time
in which the voice of reason and humanity could be heard.7 This
description embodies what is regarded as the standard, accepted
concept of voluntary manslaughter 8 and is preserved, with some
refinement, 9 in subsection 9-2(a)1 ° of the current Criminal Code.
Essential to a prosecution under this traditional subsection is a
showing that the accused acted under the influence of a passion
which was both "sudden" and the result of "serious provocation."1
What actions can be said to provide "serious provocation" for
purposes of this subsection? The statute, on its face, is unclear as
to the meaning of this phrase.1 2 However, some insight into the
5. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(3) (West Supp. 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2503(b) (Purdon 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205(c) (1978); and Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (West 1982).
6. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 Committee Comments 392-95
(Smith-Hurd 1979) (explanation of § 9-2(a) only).
7. See supra note 2.
8. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §
ANN.

76, at 572-82 (1972).
9. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(a) (1981) with id., § 362 (1961) (The
newer statute is more efficiently worded and expressly addresses the problem created when one other than the actual aggressor is killed.).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(a) (1981). See supra note 4.

11. Section 9-2(a) requires "sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation . . . ." The use of the word "intense" adds little, as "passion"
already implies an intense emotional response. See BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY

921 (3d ed. 1969).
12. The drafters of the Code engaged in little more than circumratiocination
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types of behavior generally recognized as seriously provoking was
provided in the official comments to the Code."3 Later, in their
opinion in the case of People v. Crews,14 the Illinois Supreme
Court accepted these suggested serious provocations as the law in
Illinois. According to this decision, serious provocation can result
from "substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or
combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse; but
not mere words or gestures or trespass to property."' 5 This test of
7
provocation is still being used' in spite of some problems.
in requiring that the intense passion necessary for § 9-2(a) result from serious
provocation, while defining serious provocation as behavior which will excite an
intense passion. The addition of a reasonable person standard provides little additional meaning to the term.
13. The Committee Comments to the Code suggest substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the
offender's spouse as the recognized categories of serious provocation. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 Committee Comments 393 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
14. 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E.2d 451 (1967).
15. Id. at 335, 231 N.E.2d at 453 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 Committee Comments). The Committee Comments serve as a valuable source of information on the scope and intent of the law. However, to adopt those comments as
the law, as was done in Crews, is of questionable wisdom, especially when the
conclusions arrived at by the drafters are questionable. See infra note 17.
16. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 96 Ill. App. 3d 212, 421 N.E.2d 406 (1981)
(listing the four provocations and citing the Crews decision).
17. The first problem with these identified provocations is the inclusion of
"unlawful arrest." Several years ago this was indeed a recognized provocation.
See, e.g., People v. White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929) (officers out of jurisdiction, no cause for arrest); Palmer v. People, 138 Ill. 356, 28 N.E. 130 (1891)
(arrest warrant signed by justice of the peace, not magistrate); Rafferty v. People,
69 Ill. 111 (1873) (arrest warrant issued with blanks to be filled in later). However,
the current Criminal Code indicates that a person is not authorized to use force in
resistance of an arrest, even an unlawful one. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (1981).
Further, a 1974 Illinois Supreme Court case indicated that resistance to an arrest,
including an unlawful one, is a violation of the law which would, in turn, legitimize the arrest. People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1974). Therefore,
unlawful arrest is, for all intents and purposes, not a legitimate provocation under
the modern law.
Also, a word of caution is necessary concerning words as provocation. While
"mere words" are not provocation, an extended, heated argument has often been
thought of as a mutual quarrel, sufficient for serious provocation. See People v.
Stepheny, 76 Ill. App. 2d 131, 221 N.E.2d 798 (1966) (argument during and after
crap game was sufficient provocation to support conviction for shooting; voluntary
manslaughter affirmed); People v. Gajda, 87 Ill. App. 2d 316, 232 N.E.2d 49 (1967)
(argument lasting several hours was a sufficient provocation to bartender who
shot customer; voluntary manslaughter affirmed). Argumentative words seem to
be especially provocative when exchanged between a man and woman. See People
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The current Code is not as definitive as the former regarding
the passage of time between the provocation and the act of killing.18 However, the drafters of the current Code, again by way of
the official comments, indicated that they still intended that the
act of killing maintain a close temporal relationship to the behavv. Hammock, 68 Ill. App. 3d 34, 385 N.E.2d 796 (1979) ("mistress" shot father of
her child as he slept after argument; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v.
Wesley, 65 Ill. App. 3d 25, 382 N.E.2d 358 (1978) (common law wife "fell" from
ninth floor window during argument with husband; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Delaney, 63 Ill. App. 3d 47, 379 N.E.2d 829 (1978) (girlfriend
shot boyfriend during quarrel over former girlfriend's visit; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Ahlberg, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 301 N.E.2d 608 (1973) (husband beat wife to death after argument, requested jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter at trial, then, on appeal, maintained argument was not adequate
provocation; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Gaines, 9 Ill. App. 3d
589, 292 N.E.2d 500 (1973) (after argument, wife shot husband in back while he
ate dinner; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Tucker, 3 Ill. App. 3d
152, 278 N.E.2d 516 (1971) (girlfriend bent car aerial in course of argument and
for this was shot to death by boyfriend; voluntary manslaughter affirmed). However, even allowing an argument as sufficient provocation does not explain the
result in People v. Winters, 56 Ill. App. 3d 500, 371 N.E.2d 1226 (1978) (woman
killed her husband as they simply walked toward his parents' home; voluntary
manslaughter conviction affirmed) or in People v. Newberry, 127 Ill. App. 2d 322,
262 N.E.2d 282 (1970) (defendant killed his ex-lover after she made an obscene
reply to his suicide threats; voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed).
These cases are particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that the failure to
establish provocation can result in the reversal of a voluntary manslaughter conviction. See, e.g., People v. Echoles, 36 Ill. App. 3d 845, 344 N.E.2d 620 (1976)
(stepdaughter attempted to defend mother from stepfather and was killed by
him; reasonable defensive actions were not provocation, voluntary manslaughter
conviction reversed); People v. Smith, 16 Ill. App. 3d 553, 306 N.E.2d 606 (1973)
(husband was dusting gun when it discharged, killing his wife; voluntary manslaughter reversed, no provocation); People v. Clark, 15 Ill. App. 3d 756, 305
N.E.2d 218 (1973) (woman stabbed neighbor during discussion of deceased's earlier reprimand of defendant's child; neither reprimand nor conversation adequate
provocation, voluntary manslaughter reversed); People v. Thompson, 11 Ill. App.
3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592 (1973) (woman found dead in alley; husband's voluntary
manslaughter conviction overturned for lack of evidence of provocation).
Some of these cases, most notably Hammond, Winters, and Gaines, also illustrate a failure to consider the cooling-off period between the provocation and
the killing. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (scope of cooling-off
period).
18. Where the former statute spoke of an "interval between the assault or
provocation given, and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity
to be heard. . .", the new Code only requires that the passion be "sudden." Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 362 (1961) with id., § 9-2(a) (1981).
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ior provoking it. 10 No clear-cut test of how much time can pass
before suddenness is negatived has been established. The rule applied in Illinois suggests that:
A sufficient "cooling-off period" depends upon the 'extent to
which the passions have been aroused and the nature of the act
which caused the provocation ....
[N]o yardstick of time can be
used by the court to measure a reasonable period of passion but it
must vary as do the facts of every case. 0

This case-by-case analysis was adopted prior to the enactment of
the 1961 Code, but nonetheless retains its validity in current

cases."1
Finally, it should be noted that while the statutory description
of subsection 9-2(a) enunciates no specific mental state, the traditional formulation of voluntary manslaughter generally contemplates intentional actions. 22 A recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Leonard,2 3 indicates that the court agrees
with this evaluation. 4
19. The Committee Comments indicate that the language describing the passion in the 1961 Code "means the same as the former 'sudden, violent impulse of
passion supposed to be irresistible,' followed by a description of the 'cooling-off'
period which negatives such passion." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 Committee
Comments 394 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
20. People v. Harris, 8 Ill. 2d 431, 435, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1956).
21. See, e.g., People v. Hudson, 71 111. App. 3d 504, 390 N.E.2d 5 (1979).
What constitutes a sufficient cooling-off period depends upon the magnitude of the provoking act and the degree to which passions have been
aroused in the defendant. '[N]o yardstick of time can be used by the
court to measure a reasonable period of passion but it must vary as do
the facts of every case.'
Id. at 511, 390 N.E.2d at 10 (citing Harris).
It should be noted, that if it is shown that there was a cooling-off period between the provocation and the act of killing, a voluntary manslaughter conviction
can be reversed. See, e.g., People v. Newman, 360 Ill. 226, 195 N.E. 645 (1935)
(time defendant spent locating his gun was adequate cooling-off period; voluntary
manslaughter reversed); People v. McMurry, 64 Ill. App. 2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 7
(1965) (estimated six minutes it took defendant to get knife was adequate coolingoff period; voluntary manslaughter reversed).
22. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 8,

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §

§ 76, at 572; C.

TORCIA,

2

153, at 236 (14th ed. 1979); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 40

(1944).
23. 83 Ill. 2d 411, 415 N.E.2d 358 (1980).
24. The Leonard court held, inter alia, that "[t]he offense of voluntary manslaughter has commonly been described as '[an intentional homicide committed

in a sudden rage of passion engendered by adequate provocation . . . .' (Perkins,
The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391, 412 (1946))." 83 II. 2d
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SUBSECTION

9-2(b)

A relatively unusual concept 25 of voluntary manslaughter is
provided for in subsection 9-2(b) of the most recent Criminal
Code. That subsection provides that:
A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would
justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable."
This type of voluntary manslaughter has been characterized as a
killing performed in the "unreasonable belief that deadly force is
necessary to protect [the actor] from imminent death or great bodily harm, 27 and is sometimes referred to as an imperfect claim to
the right of self-defense.2"
Reasons and Rationales
Prior to the enactment of the 1961 Code, Illinois cases which
suggested unnecessary use of force in self-defense were generally
included under what would then have been the physical injury or
mutual combat categories of provocation, 2 ' which is still the resting
place of such action in some jurisdictions.3 0 Why then did the
drafters of the 1961 Code include this variant definition of voluntary manslaughter?
The actual reasons for this action have never been made clear.
While the Committee Comments to the Code are said to provide a
detailed explanation of its provisions,"1 they are silent as to why
subsection 9-2(b) was added.3 2 Other articles purporting to explain
at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 363.
25. This offense is recognized in only four other U.S. jurisdictions. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(b) (1981) (footnote, identifying "Article 7" as
§ 7-1 through § 7-14 of chapter 38, omitted).
27. People v. Martinez, 4 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1076, 283 N.E.2d 268, 276 (1972).
28. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., supra note 8, § 77, at 583-84.
29. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 392 Ill. 519, 64 N.E.2d 739 (1946); People v.
Jones, 384 Ill. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943); People v. Maria, 359 II. 231, 194 N.E.
510 (1935); People v. Beil, 322 Ill. 434, 153 N.E. 639 (1926).
30. "[A]ssault or battery may constitute adequate provocation to reduce the
[self-defense] killing to voluntary manslaughter." C. TORCIA, supra note 22, § 158,
at 252.
31. See Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, 50 ILL. B.J. 34 (1961).
32. See supra note 6.
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the Criminal Code of 1961 add little to an understanding of this
subsection."3
The primary impetus for the inclusion of this additional definition appears to have been the Illinois Supreme Court's 1949 decision of People v. Smith.3 4 Prior to that decision, the court had
been unable to establish a consistent analysis of the relationship
between self-defense and voluntary manslaughter, 3 but appeared
inclined to uphold convictions for that offense in cases which were
arguably excessive defensive actions. 6
In Smith, the defendant was followed to his sister's home after
a barroom fight and was assaulted. The attacker died as a result of
the ensuing affray, and Smith was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. In deciding the case, the Illinois Supreme Court first undertook the task of clarifying the then extant law of self-defense in
Illinois." The court went on to explain its inability to reconcile
33. See Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 and Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 461 (1971); Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, 50 ILL. B.J. 34 (1961); Morse, The Criminal Code of Illinois of
1961, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 27 (1965).

34. 404 Ill. 350, 88 N.E.2d 834 (1949).
35. As early as 1868, the Illinois Supreme Court considered cases of apparently unnecessary lethal self-defense to be manslaughter. In Adams v. People, 47.
Ill. 376 (1868), the court approved the following language in a jury instruction:
[I]f they find that defendant voluntarily got into the difficulty or fight
with [the deceased], but did not intend to kill at the time, and did not
decline further fighting before the mortal blow was struck by him, and
then drew his knife and with it struck and killed [the deceased], they will
find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, although the cutting and killing were done in order to prevent an assault upon him by [the
deceased]...
Id. at 379.
However, in the 1921 case of People v. Davis, 300 Ill. 226, 133 N.E. 320
(1921), the Illinois Supreme court indicated that voluntary manslaughter instructions did not apply to a plea of self-defense.
In the following year, that same court decided People v, Pursley, 302 Ill. 62,
134 N.E. 128 (1922). Therein, the court reversed and remanded Pursley's murder
conviction for the lack of instructions on manslaughter. The court said that even
if the defendant were the aggressor in a fist fight, if his adversary unexpectedly
attacked him with a deadly weapon, "the act of the defendant in resisting such
attack with his knife which caused the death of the deceased would not be murder
but manslaughter." Id. at 73, 134 N.E. at 133.
36. See supra note 29.
37. The Smith court summed up some of the basic elements of the Illinois
law on lethal self-defense in the following paragraph:
The rule in this State is that a man may deliberately use a deadly
weapon in self-defense and may intend to kill his opponent and yet not
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defensive actions with the offense of voluntary manslaughter as it
was then defined. 8 In reversing Smith's conviction, the court held
that voluntary manslaughter referred "only to cases.

. .

where the

killing [was] the result of a sudden impulse of passion supposed to
be irresistible" which had "no application to a plea of selfdefense.""9
As a result of the Smith decision, there was no offense, other
than murder, under which to penalize an excessive self-defense.
When, only a few years later, work on a comprehensive criminal
code was begun,'0 the drafters had to decide whether to leave this
situation as it stood or to define a new offense by which to punish
unnecessary defensive actions. The state of Wisconsin had passed
a new criminal code in 19551 which the drafters of the Illinois

Code relied upon for guidance.'2 The Wisconsin law included a
statutorily defined offense of unnecessary self-defense/voluntary
manslaughter.' The drafters of Illinois' Code adopted a similar
definition and returned consideration of an excessive self-defense
to the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
be guilty of either murder or manslaughter. (People v. Davis, 300 Ill.
226.) If one who is not the first assailant is in a place where he has a

lawful right to be and is put in apparent danger of his life or of suffering
great bodily harm, he need not attempt to escape but may lawfully stand
his ground and meet force with force even to the taking of his assailant's
life. (People v.Durand, 307 Ill.
611.) Nor is it necessary that the deceased should have used against his slayer a deadly weapon to justify a
killing in self-defense. People v. Turner, 385 Ill. 344.
404 Ill. at 354, 88 N.E.2d at 836.
38. See supra note 3 (as definition was unchanged between 1874 and 1961).
39. Smith, 404 Ill. at 354-55, 88 N.E.2d at 836.
40. The Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois Criminal Code was first organized in May of 1954, and substantive drafting began in 1956. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, Committee Foreword ix-x (Smith-Hurd 1979).

41. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.01 (West 1982) (introductory section of the
criminal code indicating the effective date of July 1, 1956).
42. See Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 and Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 461, 463-64 (1971).
43. The Wisconsin Criminal Code adopted in 1955 defines manslaughter in
part as follows:
Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class C felony:
(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of
a felony;...

WIS. STAT. ANN.

§ 940.05 (West 1982).
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That there was a need to create an offense other than murder
under which to penalize an excessive self-defense, and that voluntary manslaughter was the category most adaptable to this need, is
explicable through an analysis of the interrelation of some of the
essential factors involved in murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
self-defense. As a first step in exploring this relationship, some basic assertions need to be enunciated.
First, voluntary manslaughter has been generally described as
a crime falling somewhere between murder and exoneration,
sometimes being referred to as a legal compromise between the
two."5 Next, one of the primary differences between murder and
voluntary manslaughter is the lack of malice in the latter.4" Finally, it should be understood that the absence of malice is also a
feature of self-defense; an argument of self-defense will not exonerate malicious, retaliatory or vengeful behavior.47
Any claim of self-defense must be analyzed on two levels."9 As
stated by one appellate court: "Where self-defense is involved to
justify a killing, the initial issue is whether the defendant believed
she was acting in self-defense. The secondary issue is whether such
belief if it existed was reasonable."4 Stated another way, the ini44. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., supra note 8, § 75, at 571.
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 Committee Comments 392 (Smith-Hurd

1979).
46. See People v. Tillman, 26 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 187 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1963)
("Malice, either express or implied, is a necessary element of the crime of murder
and distinguishes murder from manslaughter."); People v. Jones, 384 Ill. 407, 412,
51 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1943) ("The presence or absence of malice is the element
which distinguishes murder from manslaughter."); People v. Scott, 123 Ill. App.
2d 107, 114, 259 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1970) ("The difference between murder and
manslaughter is the absence of malice as an element of the crime in the latter
offense.") (citing Jones).
47. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 115 (1944) (Self-defense "does not imply the
right to attack, nor will it condone acts done for purposes of retaliation, revenge,

or redress. A person may not kill another with malice

. . .

and yet do so in self-

defense so as to be acquitted of all criminality." (footnotes omitted)). See also
People v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 2d 218, 222, 186 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1962) ("The right of
self-defense ...

does not permit killing in retaliation or revenge .

. . .");

People

v. Dillon, 24 Ill. 2d 122, 125, 180 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1962) ("[T]he right of selfdefense does not imply the right of attack ... or permit action done in retaliation or revenge."); People v. Welsch, 110 Ill. App. 2d 450, 249 N.E.2d 714 (1969)
(abstract only); People v. Peery, 81 111. App. 2d 372, 377, 225 N.E.2d 730, 732
(1967) ("[S]elf-defense does not permit killing in retaliation or revenge .... 91.
48. See generally C. TORCIA, supra note 22, § 125, at 123-24.
49. People v. Jones, 131 Ill. App. 2d 647, 650, 264 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1970).
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tial analysis concerns the defendant's subjective belief that the defensive actions were necessary, and the secondary analysis questions whether that subjective belief was objectively reasonable.
What, then, are the possible results from applying this dual
analysis to a situation where an alleged self-defense resulted in
death? If the initial, subjective test is not passed, there is no need
to proceed to the objective test. As the same court which described
the two-part analysis put it, "[iif the evidence fails to support the
claim that the defendant believed herself to be acting in self-defense, then the offense may be murder."50 Failure to pass the subjective test has resulted in a murder conviction in past cases.5 1
However, at the other extreme, when both the subjective and objective criteria are met, exoneration, as justifiable self-defense, is
possible. 2
A third alternative is also possible. The defendant may be
found to have had a subjective belief in the necessity of lethal selfdefense, but such belief may be found to be objectively unreasonable. Failure to pass the second test would preclude exoneration.
However, accepting that the defendant believed he was acting in
self-defense would imply that the defendant did not act out of
malice, which would distinguish the offense from murder. This
would suggest that a lethal but unnecessary act of self-defense falls
somewhere between murder and exoneration. Therefore, the crime
of excessive self-defense correlates well with the general descrip50. Id.

51. See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 18 Ill. 2d 489, 165 N.E.2d 296 (1960); People
v. Owens, 45 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 360 N.E.2d 481 (1977); People v. Dorsey, 98 Ill.

App. 2d 259, 240 N.E.2d 391 (1968).

52. See, e.g., People v. Lenzi, 41 Ill. App. 3d 825, 355 N.E.2d (1976) (bar
owner justified in using lethal force when assisting off-duty police officer quell
disturbance in bar; conviction for two counts of aggravated battery and voluntary
manslaughter. reversed); People v. Shields, 18 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 311 N.E.2d 212
(1974) (abstract only; voluntary manslaughter conviction reversed); People v.
Morgan, 114 Ill. App. 2d 421, 252 N.E.2d 730 (1969) (security guard in night club,

thinking victim was reaching for gun, shot unarmed waiter during argument; vol-

untary manslaughter reversed, reasonable fear for life); People v. Honey, 69 Ill.
App. 2d 429, 217 N.E.2d 371 (1966) (smaller, younger defendant hit deceased in
jaw with bedrail when cornered in alley; voluntary manslaughter reversed, reasonable defensive action).
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. See People v. Jones, 26 Ill. 2d 381, 385, 186 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1962)
("Malice is an essential element of the crime of murder . . . ."); People v. Muldrow, 30 Ill. App. 3d 209, 332 N.E.2d 664 (1975); People v. Massey, 49 Ill. App. 3d
588, 364 N.E.2d 933 (1977).
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tion of voluntary manslaughter."
Nineteen years after the enactment of the Criminal Code of
1961, the Illinois Supreme Court expounded this rationale in the
case of People v. Lockett.56 Therein, the eighteen-year-old defendant argued self-defense in the shooting of an unarmed, seventyeight-year-old man. The judge instructed the jury in self-defense,
but refused to instruct them in voluntary manslaughter. In upholding the appellate court's reversal and remand, the supreme court
agreed with several appellate court opinions which held that evidence which supports a self-defense instruction will also support a
voluntary manslaughter instruction. The court explained that,
given the self-defense instruction, the jury could reach one of three
conclusions:
First, it could decide that the defendant did not have a subjective
belief that use of force was necessary. In that case, the verdict
should be murder. Second, it could determine that the defendant
had the subjective belief that use of force was necessary and that
subjective belief was reasonable. In that event, the defendant's
use of force was justified and the verdict should be not guilty.
Third, a jury could conclude that the defendant subjectively besubjective believed that use of force was necessary, but that this
7
lief was unreasonable under the circumstances.5
The court concluded that this third alternative "is the precise situation in which a verdict of voluntary manslaughter should be
reached under section 9-2(b)."' 8
Scope and Parameters
Analyzing the provisions of section 9-2(b), one sees that there
are three elements which must be established. To convict under
this subsection, it must be shown that: (1) the accused acted intentionally or knowingly; (2) the accused believed the killing would be
excused or justified under article 7 of the Code; and (3) such belief
was unreasonable. 5" These latter two elements are closely related
55.
56.
57.
58.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980).
Id. at 551-52, 413 N.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 552, 413 N.E.2d at 381. This case also reiterates the proposition

that reversible error occurs both when the evidence will not support a voluntary

manslaughter conviction and instructions on that offense are given, and when the

evidence does suggest voluntary manslaughter but instructions are not provided.
Id. at 550-51, 413 N.E.2d at 381.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(b) (1981).
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and considered together, as the requirement of reasonableness is
an integral portion of any self-defense claim.60
The first element, the requirement of a specific mental state of
either intent or knowledge, is a noticeable change from the traditional offense of voluntary manslaughter in Illinois." A defendant
accused of voluntary manslaughter under subsection (b) must be
shown to have killing as a conscious objective or purpose,62 or be
consciously aware that death is practically certain to be caused by
his conduct. 3 As the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated, selfdefense "[b]y its very nature . . .relates to knowingly and inten-

tionally using force to deter another . . . .,s This is also the state
of mind suggested in the statutory description of justifiable, lethal
self-defense."
Next, it must be established that the accused believed that the
killing would be justified or excused under the provisions of article
7 of the Code.66 While this article describes a variety of justifications for, or methods of exoneration from, any type of criminal offense, when the behavior involves the use of lethal force against
another person, two factors described in section 7-1 control. Ac60. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.

61. No mental state is described in § 9-2(a). See

ILL.

RAEV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-

2(a) (1981).
62. "Intent" as defined by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1981).
63. "Knowledge" as defined by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5(b) (1981).
64. People v. Joyner, 50 Ill. 2d 302, 309, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1972) (citing
People v. Jersky, 377 Ill. 261, 36 N.E.2d 347 (1941)).
65. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1981) ("However, he is justified in the
use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm
. ..

.V1.

66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-1 to 7-14 (1981). Article 7 is entitled "Justifiable Use of Force; Exoneration" and deals with the use of force in defense of self or
another (§ 7-1), in defense of dwelling or property (§§ 7-2, 7-3), by an aggressor
(§7-4) and in making, resisting or maintaining an arrest (§§ 7-5 through 7-9). All
of these sections are relevant to § 9-2(b).
Less relevant, but not completely inapplicable to voluntary manslaughter, are
sections 7-10 (Execution of Death Sentence) and 7-12 (Entrapment). These sections should rarely arise as a defense to a killing.
Section 7-11, on "Compulsion" has no application to a murder or voluntary
manslaughter prosecution. People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 411 N.E.2d 849
(1980).
Section 7-13, concerning "Necessity" is a defense only if the injury avoided is
greater than the injury inflicted because of necessity. Since no injury is greater
than death, this section has no application to voluntary manslaughter.
Section 7-14 indicates that the defenses of this article are affirmative
defenses.
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cording to that section, a person is justified in the use of force intended or likely to cause death "only if he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony."'6 7 The other pertinent sections of article 7 are in accord with

these two justifications for the use of lethal force." And, since the
drafters regard a forcible felony as any serious offense which in its
nature involves or threatens the use of physical force or violence
against any individual, 6 these two justifications can be read as
one. The essential basis, then, for the use of lethal force in defense
of self or another is the reasonable belief that a person is
threatened with impending death or serious physical injury.
The factors involved in testing the justification of an act of
self-defense are not explicitly listed in article 7, but the courts, in
analyzing that article, have provided a list of the elements necessary to justify the use of force in defense of person. 0 Close analysis
§ 7-1 (1981).
68. Thus, section 7-2, on use of force in defense of dwelling, allows lethal
force only to prevent assault or personal violence to the actor or another or to
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

prevent the commission of a felony, within the dwelling. Section 7-3 allows the
use of lethal force only when defending other property against the commission of
a forcible felony. Section 7-4 allows an aggressor to use deadly force after withdrawal and retreat, if a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm is posed.
Sections 7-5 through 7-9 allow the use of lethal force in the course of an arrest
provided the force is necessary to prevent defeat of the arrest and the arrest is for
a forcible felony, of an escaping armed felon, or to otherwise protect human life.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-2 to 7-9 (1981).
69. The Committee Comments to section 7-1 suggest that a forcible felony is
"a serious offense which in its nature involves or threatens personal violence." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 Committee Comments 366 (Smith-Hurd 1979). It is interesting to note that the drafters endeavored to quote section 2-8 (defining forcible
felony) in these comments, but reversed its provisions, placing the general
description of the conduct necessary before the specific examples. This reversal
could have some effect on the statutory construction of this section under the
principle of ejusdem generis. According to this rule of construction, general language following specific examples is presumed to be limited to the same class,
kind, or nature as the examples specifically enumerated. Construction is not so
limited where the general language precedes the examples. Compare ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 Committee Comments 366 (Smith-Hurd 1979) with ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1981).
70. These elements are: (1) that the force is threatened against a person;
(2) that the person threatened is not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of
harm is imminent; (4) that the force threatened is unlawful; (5) that the
person threatened must actually believe: (a) that a danger exists, (b) that
the use of force is necessary to avert the danger, (c) that the kind and
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of the test shows that, in order to justify the use of lethal self-

defense, the accused generally must not be the aggressor and must
be confronted with what he reasonably believes to be the imminent
use of unlawful and potentially harmful or deadly force against
71
himself or another.
What, then, will promote a finding that such belief is unreasonable? A "reasonable belief" occurs when "the person concerned,
acting as a reasonable man, believes that the described facts exist."' 72 Stated in the negative, an unreasonable belief occurs
when
the person concerned, as a reasonable man, would not believe that
the described facts exist. Also, for purposes of self-defense, the test
is not what the jury thinks a reasonable person would have believed but what the defendant, as a reasonable person under those
circumstances, believed.7
Guidance as to what has been found to make an honest claim
of self-defense unreasonable can be found only by reviewing the
Illinois court decisions of the past twenty years. Several factors appear to be applied, often in combination, to render a belief in the
need for lethal self-defense unreasonable and the actor guilty of
voluntary manslaughter.
The factor which can most easily defeat a self-defense claim,
as well as convince the trier of fact that the belief in the claim is
unreasonable, is aggressive behavior by the accused. A person acting as an aggressor and using potentially lethal force will often be
unable to establish the basic requisites of justifiable self-defense,
and may be convicted of murder. 7 However, an initial aggressor,
amount of force which he uses is necessary; and (6) that the above beliefs
are reasonable. There is a further principle involved, when, as in the instant case, the defendant uses deadly force. This principle limits the use
of deadly force to those situations in which (a) the threatened force will
-cause death or great bodily harm or (b) the force threatened is a forcible
felony.
People v. Williams, 56 Ill. App. 2d 159, 165-66, 205 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1965). This
test appears to be largely garnered from the Committee Comments to section 7-1.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 Committee Comments 364-65 (Smith-Hurd

1979).
71. These factors being the essential elements of the test described in Williams. See supra note 70.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-19 (1981).
73. See, e.g., People v. McClain, 410 Ill. 280, 102 N.E.2d 134 (1951); People v.
Lenzi, 41111. App. 3d 825, 355 N.E.2d 153 (1976); People v. Vaughn, 26 Ill. App.
3d 247, 324 N.E.2d 697 (1975).
74. See supra note 51.
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who applies lethal force only after he has broken off the affray and
attempted retreat, when threatened with imminent death or great
bodily harm by his victim, may be justified in the use of deadly
force. 75 Between these extremes are three situations: (1) where the

accused was the aggressor, using potentially lethal force, and actu-

ally killed only after attempting to retreat;7 6 (2) where the accused
may or may not have been the aggressor;" and (3) where the accused was not the original aggressor but became the aggressor during the affray.78 Any of these situations may result in a verdict of

guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

The second factor which may make a fatal self-defense appear
unreasonable is a failure to avoid the conflict, or to allow the opponent to escape, when possible. According to Illinois case law, there
is no duty to retreat when attacked in a place where one has a
lawful right to be. 79 A person may stand his ground and may use
lethal force where apparently necessary.8 0 However, a reasonable
person would not necessarily believe death or great bodily harm
was imminent when the threat could have been defused simply by
75. See ILL.

REv. STAT.

ch. 38, § 7-4(c)(1) (1981).

The Committee Comments to § 7-4 indicate that subsection (c)(1) "obtains
when the aggressor, not using deadly force, is suddenly confronted with deadly
force and has retreated, as he reasonably believes, to the practicable limit but
nevertheless reasonably believes that he must use deadly force to prevent death
or great bodily harm to himself." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-4 Committee Comments 410 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
76. See, e.g., People v. Ureste, 7 Ill. App. 3d 545, 288 N.E.2d 45 (1972) (defendant went on shooting spree in bar, then retreated and hid on bandstand, but
killed victim when defending himself from shots fired by bartender; voluntary
manslaughter affirmed).
App. 3d 771, 362 N.E.2d 430 (1977) (defendant
77. See People v. Crue, 47 Ill.
fired into angry mob outside bar after firing shots into air, stopping their advance;
voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Pickett, 35 Ill. App. 3d 909, 342
N.E.2d 766 (1976) (defendant shot victim who had slashed him with razor previous day; voluntary manslaughter affirmed).
App. 3d 880, 338 N.E.2d 574 (1975) (defen78. See People v. Munguia, 33 Ill.
dant broke off fight, got knife from car, returned and killed victim; voluntary
App. 3d 853, 279 N.E.2d 372
manslaughter affirmed); People v. Galarza, 3 Ill.
(1972) (victim assaulted defendant, defendant got gun, pursued victim into alley,
shot unarmed victim 5 times; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Knox,
116 II. App. 2d 427, 252 N.E.2d 549 (1969) (defendant disarmed attacker then
shot him five times; voluntary manslaughter affirmed).
79. See People v. Smith, 404 Ill. 350, 88 N.E.2d 834 (1949); People v. Wil2d 239, 243, 311 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1974) ("[T]here is no requirement
liams, 57 Ill.
that a person retreat before employing force in his defense.").
80. See the cases cited supra note 79.
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departing or allowing the opponent to depart." Therefore, in the
application of lethal force in self-defense, failure on the part of the
accused to exercise the option of retreat or to allow his or her opponent to do the same, 2 may contribute to a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.
The third factor which may help convince the trier of fact that
the use of lethal force was in fact unreasonable is a finding that the
deceased victim (even though he may have been the aggressor) was
not armed, especially when a dangerous weapon is used in response
to the threat. There is no requirement that the attacker be armed
to justify a response of self-defense.83 However, when it becomes
apparent that the person killed was not armed and the accused
was (especially when the accused had a gun and the victim had no
weapon), 4 the trier of fact may find the use of the weapon to be
unreasonable and convict the defendant of voluntary manslaughter.85 This-outcome may also be suggested when it appears obvious
81. See People v. Robinson, 14 Ill. App. 3d 135, 302 N.E.2d 228 (1973) (defendant could have left clothing store but stayed and shot victim; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Pickett, 35 Ill. App. 3d 909, 342 N.E.2d 766 (1976)
(defendant could have retreated out door of bar, but stayed and shot victim; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Munguia, 33 Ill. App. 3d 880, 338
N.E.2d 574 (1975) (defendant went to car, then returned to kill victim; voluntary
manslaughter affirmed); People v. Colson, 70 Ill. App. 2d 447, 217 N.E.2d 348
(1966) (defendant could have backed out of garage door, elected to shoot victim
instead; voluntary manslaughter affirmed).
82. See People v. Thompson, 55 Ill. App. 3d 561, 371 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (defendant argued with brother, fight ensued, brother ran to bedroom, defendant followed and killed; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Pickett, 35 Ill. App.
3d 909, 342 N.E.2d 766 (1976) (victim shot 5 times, 3 times in back; voluntary
manslaughter affirmed); People v. Knox, 116 Ill. App. 2d 427, 252 N.E.2d 549
(1969) (defendant disarmed attacker and shot while victim begged for mercy; voluntary manslaughter affirmed).
83. See People v. Smith, 404 I11. 350, 88 N.E.2d 834 (1949); People v. Morgan, 114 Ill. App. 2d 421, 252 N.E.2d 730 (1969) (lethal self-defense found reasonable even though deceased was, in fact, unarmed; voluntary manslaughter
reversed).
84. People v. Davis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 105, 337 N.E.2d 256 (1975) (unreasonable
for person with gun in hand to believe unarmed assailant posed threat of death or
great bodily harm).
85. See People v. Polk, 70 Ill. App. 3d 903, 388 N.E.2d 864 (1979) (defendant
thought victim armed, shot him when he pulled hand from belt; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Pearson, 40 Ill. App. 3d 315, 352 N.E.2d 240 (1976)
(unarmed husbai-d killed in vacant lot by wife's boyfriend; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Diaz, 38 Ill. App. 3d 447, 348 N.E.2d 199 (1976) (defendant shot unarmed victim from several feet away; voluntary manslaughter af-
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that the attacker was not armed, 86 or when the accused disarmed
the attacker.8 7 A related concept is the general use of excessive
force. Hence, if additional wounds are inflicted after the attacker is
disabled, the self-defense may be found to be unreasonable.88
Another factor which may affect this analysis is disparity in
size between the parties to the conflict. A few cases suggest that
self-defense is more easily justified if the accused is of a lesser stature than the person killed." It is conceivable that the courts would
regard the reverse situation as a factor in measuring the reasonableness of the degree of force used.
Overall, where the defense of justifiable use of force in defense
of person is raised, if there is some available means by which the
accused could have avoided the affray altogether, or avoided the
use of lethal force to end it, a conviction for the crime of voluntary
manslaughter, rather than a murder conviction or exoneration,
may be forthcoming. Of course, if on review the use of lethal force
is found to be justified and not unreasonable, a voluntary manslaughter conviction can be overturned.90
CONCLUSION

The Committee Comments to section 9-2 of the Criminal Code
of 1961 open with a general description of voluntary manslaughter,
describing it as a "compromise between murder and exoneration,
App. 2d 447, 217 N.E.2d 348 (1966) (defendant
firmed); People v. Colson, 70 Ill.

shot unarmed victim; voluntary manslaughter affirmed).
86. See Polk, 70 I1. App. 3d 903, 388 N.E.2d 864 (1979); Diaz, 38 Ill. App. 3d
App. 3d 315, 352 N.E.2d 240
447, 348 N.E.2d 199 (1976); and Pearson, 40 Ill.
(1976). For information on each case, see supra note 85.
87. See Knox, 116 Ill. App. 2d 427, 252 N.E.2d 549 (1969), as discussed supra
note 78 & 82.
88. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 123 Ill. App. 2d 107, 259 N.E.2d 594 (1970)
.(defendant continued to stab victim after he fell to ground; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Galarza, 3 Ill. App. 3d 853, 279 N.E.2d 372 (1972) (defendant pursued victims into alley, shot total of five times; voluntary manslaughter
affirmed).
89. See People v. Pearson, 40 Ill. App. 3d 315, 352 N.E.2d 240 (1976) (vic-

tim's large stature was a factor in the fear induced in defendant but did not justify killing; voluntary manslaughter affirmed); People v. Shields, 18 Ill. App. 3d
1080, 311 N.E.2d 212 (1974) (defendant justified in self-defense in hostile crowd,

larger attacker); People v. Honey, 69 Ill. App. 2d 429, 217 N.E.2d 371 (1966) (victim's greater size helped justify self defense).

90. See supra note 52.
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recognizing but not excusing a human weakness.
...9 However,
they go on to describe this weakness only according to the "intense
passion" and "serious provocation" language of subsection 9-2(a). 9'
According to one appellate court, similar allowance for human nature is afforded under subsection 9-2(b). The court stated that:
In effect, section 9-2(b) takes into account that human beings, in
a heated atmosphere, might reach conclusions which seem to
them under the circumstances reasonable, but which in the cold
light of rational analysis are obviously unreasonable. It is the genius of our law that, while not condoning unreasonable behavior,
it nevertheless recognizes and takes into account that human beings may reach unreasonable beliefs, given the circumstances of
the moment and the conditions under which beliefs are formu9
lated and drawn. 3
As such, subsection 9-2(b) works well as a compromise between murder and exoneration. The writers have shown that, overall, this second definition of voluntary manslaughter can effectively
function in physical conflict situations to serve the ends of justice
by allowing the aggressor-killer to be convicted of murder, 94 the
retreating-aggressor or excessive defender to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter" and the legitimate self-defender to be exonerated.96 As such, it would appear to be a welcome addition to the
law in any jurisdiction.
JOHN

91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

1979).

A. PIRKO

§ 9-2 Committee Comments 392 (Smith-Hurd

92. Id.

93. People v. Vaughn, 26 Ill. App. 3d 247, 255, 324 N.E.2d 697, 702 (1975).
94. See supra note 51.

95. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 52.

